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A B S T R A C T
Attention refers to the set of cognitive mechanisms that facilitate the prioritization of incoming sensory in-
formation. Existing research suggests that motivationally salient stimuli, such as those associated with reward,
are prioritized by the attention system and that this prioritization occurs independently of an observer’s goals.
Specifically, studies of visual search have shown that stimuli signalling the availability of monetary reward are
more likely to capture eye movements, even when participants are motivated to ignore such stimuli. In the
current study we ask whether reward magnitude influences only the likelihood that stimuli will capture spatial
attention, or whether reward also influences the ease with which people can disengage attention from a location
when they are motivated to move their attention elsewhere. Three experiments examined the time taken to
disengage from a centrally presented distractor that signalled the availability of high or low reward. We found
that participants took longer to move their eyes away from a high-reward distractor, even though this came at
financial cost (Experiment 1), that participants were unable to suppress a high-reward distractor consistently
presented at the central location (Experiment 2), that slower responding was not due to behavioural freezing in
the presence of a signal of high reward (Experiment 3), and that slower responding persisted even when rewards
were no longer available (Experiment 4). These results indicate that reward modulates attentional disengage-
ment: signals of high reward hold attention for longer, even when this is counterproductive for performance of
ongoing tasks. Our findings further highlight the role of reward in the conflict between automatic and goal-
directed attentional processing.
1. Introduction
Attention refers to the set of cognitive mechanisms that act to select
and prioritize certain pieces of sensory information from the environ-
ment for further processing and action. It is well established that this
prioritization can be influenced by our goals (other things being equal,
we will preferentially attend to task-relevant stimuli: Egeth & Yantis,
1997; Noudoost, Chang, Steinmetz, & Moore, 2010) and also by the
physical features of stimuli (our attention can be captured by stimuli
that are distinct in terms of their colour, luminance, onset etc, even
when these stimuli are task-irrelevant: Theeuwes, 1992; Theeuwes,
Kramer, Hahn, & Irwin, 1998). Notably, more recent research has de-
monstrated that attention is also fundamentally influenced by our
previous experiences with stimuli, and in particular by previous
learning about how stimuli relate to motivationally significant events
such as rewards and punishments (see reviews: Anderson, 2016; Failing
& Theeuwes, 2018; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, & Wills, 2016;
Watson, Pearson, Chow et al., 2019; Watson, Pearson, Wiers, & Le
Pelley, 2019).
The influence of reward on attention has been demonstrated using a
range of procedures testing both spatial attention (e.g., Anderson,
Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010; Kiss,
Driver, & Eimer, 2009) and non-spatial attention (e.g., Le Pelley,
Seabrooke, Kennedy, Pearson, & Most, 2017; Raymond & O’Brien,
2009). In the current study, we used a variant of a procedure developed
by Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015. This procedure used
eye-tracking, which provides a useful online measure of spatial atten-
tion since an eye movement (saccade) to a given location is always
preceded by a shift of attention to that location (Deubel & Schneider,
1996). Le Pelley et al. used an additional singleton task (Theeuwes,
1991, 1992) in which, on each trial, participants performed a visual
search for a diamond target among circles. Critically, one of the circles
in the display was a colour-singleton distractor, and the colour of this
distractor signalled the magnitude of monetary reward that was avail-
able for making a rapid response (an eye movement to the diamond
target). Notably, participants were more likely to make an erroneous
saccade to the coloured distractor (rather than to the target) when it
was rendered in a colour that signalled the availability of high reward
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versus low reward, even though looking at this reward-signalling dis-
tractor was counterproductive and resulted in omission of the reward
that would otherwise have been earned (see also: Albertella et al., 2017;
Failing, Nissens, Pearson, Le Pelley, & Theeuwes, 2015; Le Pelley et al.,
2015; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most, & Le Pelley, 2015, 2016). That is,
participants showed an attentional bias towards the high-reward-sig-
nalling distractor, even though this meant they were more likely to lose
out on high rewards and hence was contrary to their goal of maximizing
reward. This finding of a reward-related attentional bias (Anderson,
2016; Failing & Theeuwes, 2018; Le Pelley et al., 2016; Watson,
Pearson, Wiers et al., 2019), has been taken to suggest that reward
learning influences the likelihood that stimuli will capture spatial at-
tention. On this account, attention is more likely to be deployed to the
location of a high-reward stimulus than a low-reward stimulus, even
when this conflicts with the observer’s goals.
Performance impairments caused by salient distractors may not only
be a consequence of influences on capture of spatial attention, however
– they may also result from effects on disengagement of attention (Born,
Kerzel, & Theeuwes, 2011; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Posner, Inhoff,
Friedrich, & Cohen, 1987; Wang, Samara, & Theeuwes, 2019). If at-
tention is captured to the location of a salient distractor, disengagement
from that distractor is required before attention can shift to the search
target. In the context of reward-related stimuli, this raises the possibi-
lity that in addition to reward influencing the likelihood that stimuli
will capture spatial attention, it might also influence the difficulty and
speed of disengaging attention from a stimulus location.
Disentangling effects of a manipulation (such as reward) on atten-
tional capture from effects on disengagement is not trivial (Clarke,
MacLeod, & Guastella, 2013; Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002). In the case of
attentional bias for reward, we are aware of two existing approaches.
The first of these approaches used gaze dwell time as a measure of (dis)
engagement in the type of visual search task with reward-related sti-
muli described above (Le Pelley et al., 2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky,
2012). Specifically, these studies analysed the duration for which gaze
dwelled on the reward-signalling distractor (on the subset of trials in
which this distractor captured gaze). Neither study found that this
dwell duration was significantly influenced by the size of reward sig-
nalled by the distractor. This could be taken as evidence against the
idea that reward leads to delayed disengagement. However, drawing
this conclusion requires accepting the null hypothesis – and notably the
measure of disengagement in these studies is likely to be quite in-
sensitive, for two reasons. First, there was only a relatively small subset
of trials on which gaze was captured by the distractor, and hence on
which distractor dwell duration could be measured (less than 10% of
trials for the low-reward distractor in Le Pelley et al.’s study), meaning
that estimates were likely to be noisy. And second, corrective saccades
(to the target) may be prepared in parallel with the initial (capture)
saccade to the distractor (Born et al., 2011; Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002),
such that subtle effects of reward on disengagement might have been
masked.
The second approach to studying the effect of reward on attentional
disengagement has used a modified version of the dot probe task
(Müller, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2016). In this task, two ‘cue’ stimuli
appeared simultaneously, quickly followed by a target which appeared
in the location of one of these stimuli. Müller et al. found that responses
to the target were slower on invalid trials (in which the cue display
featured a reward-related cue and a neutral [non-reward] cue, and the
target subsequently appeared in the location of the neutral cue) than on
neutral-baseline trials (in which the cue display featured two neutral
cues, and the target appeared randomly in the location of one of them).
This pattern is consistent with the idea of delayed disengagement from
the reward-related cue. Alternatively, however, the finding could re-
flect an influence of reward on capture rather than disengagement. If
reward cues are more likely to capture attention than neutral cues, then
on invalid trials attention is more likely to be at the ‘incorrect’ location
when the target appears (since this is the location of the reward cue),
whereas on baseline trials attention is equally likely to be at the correct
or incorrect location (since both cues are identical on these trials). The
response-time cost on invalid trials could then reflect the fact that at-
tention is less likely to be in the location of the target when it appears
on invalid trials than identical-cue trials – even if the time required for
attention to disengage from reward-related versus neutral cues is si-
milar.
The pattern of slower responding on invalid trials than neutral-
baseline trials in Müller et al.’s (2016) study could reflect delayed
disengagement from, or enhanced capture by, reward cues. A further
aspect of Müller et al.’s findings seems—at first glance—to provide
evidence against the explanation in terms of capture. Specifically,
participants did not show significantly faster responding on valid trials
(in which the cue display featured a reward cue and a neutral cue, and
the target subsequently appeared in the location of the reward cue)
than on neutral-baseline trials; if attention were more likely to be
captured to the location of a reward cue, then one might expect facil-
itation on valid trials. One interpretation of these findings is that there
was therefore no effect of capture, and hence in turn that the ‘invalid
versus baseline ‘comparison must demonstrate an effect of disengage-
ment. However, once again drawing this conclusion requires accepting
the null hypothesis (“there was no significant difference in performance
on valid versus baseline trials; therefore there was no effect of cap-
ture”). This issue is particularly germane because floor effects on re-
sponse time may have masked facilitation on valid trials, and also be-
cause there is no a priori reason to assume—under a capture-based
account—that the magnitude of facilitation when attention was cap-
tured to the correct location (on valid trials) would be equal to the
magnitude of impairment when attention was captured to the incorrect
location (on invalid trials).
To summarise, on the face of it the existing literature relating to
effects of reward on disengagement suggests an inconsistency: one
study (Müller et al., 2016) has reported data consistent with delayed
disengagement from reward cues, whereas other research (Le Pelley
et al., 2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012) has not found evidence of
this effect. However, both sets of data are subject to caveats to at least
some degree. The aim of the current study was therefore to provide a
strong and direct test of the influence of reward on attentional disen-
gagement. Addressing this issue is important in its own right: a better
understanding of the nature of the attentional mechanisms underlying
attentional bias for reward would provide insight into when and how
reward-related stimuli might be expected to take and hold control of
attentional processing (and hence potentially interfere with ongoing,
goal-directed behaviour). Beyond this, the question may have im-
plications for our understanding of certain clinical disorders. Atten-
tional biases to motivationally relevant stimuli have been implicated in
disorders such as addiction (bias towards reward; Albertella et al.,
2017; Albertella, Watson, Yücel, & Le Pelley, 2019; Anderson, Faulkner,
Rilee, Yantis, & Marvel, 2013; Christiansen, Schoenmakers, & Field,
2015) and anxiety (bias towards threat; Cisler & Koster, 2010). A better
understanding of the source of such biases—whether they reflect the
extent to which stimuli pull attention or hold attention—may inform the
development of training-based interventions (MacLeod & Clarke, 2015;
Rinck, Wiers, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2018; Wiers, Gladwin, Hofmann,
Salemink, & Ridderinkhof, 2013) so that they are better-targeted at the
root of the problem.
The current study investigated the potential influence of reward on
attentional disengagement using an approach originally developed by
Brockmole, Boot and colleagues (Blakely, Wright, Dehili, Boot, &
Brockmole, 2012; Brockmole & Boot, 2009). Experiment 1 was based on
the eye-tracking procedure used by Le Pelley et al., 2015, but crucially,
on some trials the reward-signalling colour-singleton distractor ap-
peared at a central location (see Fig. 1): that is, at the location parti-
cipants were already fixating (and presumably attending) prior to ap-
pearance of the search display. These trials therefore required
participants to disengage their attention from the central distractor in
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order to locate and make an eye-movement to the target diamond
(which on these central-distractor trials was always presented in one of
the outer locations). By presenting the distractor at an already-attended
location (cf. Müller et al., 2016), this procedure minimizes the influence
of any effect of reward on spatial capture, and instead provides a re-
latively pure measure of the ease/speed with which attention can be
shifted away from the critical distractor. The key question was whether
participants would take longer to disengage from a distractor signalling
availability of high reward than a distractor signalling low reward,




2.1.1. Participants and apparatus
All research reported in this article was approved by the UNSW
Sydney Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel (Psychology). Previous
studies of reward-related attentional bias using procedures similar to
that used here (Failing et al., 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson et al.,
2015) have found medium to very large effect sizes (dz = 0.54–2.2).
Thus, we tested 24 participants in the current study (12 females; age
M = 19.4 years, SEM = 0.53), which gave power of .80 to detect an
effect size of dz = 0.6. Participants received course credit and a per-
formance-related monetary bonus (M = $9.80 AUD, SEM = $0.10).
Participants were tested individually using a Tobii TX300 eye-
tracker (sample rate 300 Hz), mounted on a 23-inch monitor
(1920 × 1280 resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate). Participants’ heads were
positioned in a chinrest 60 cm from the screen. For gaze-contingent
calculations, the experiment script down-sampled the data from the
eye-tracker to 100 Hz. Stimulus presentation was controlled by
MATLAB using Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997;
Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). Experiment scripts and raw data for all
experiments reported in this article are available via the Open Science
Framework at https://osf.io/je6p5/.
2.1.2. Stimuli and design
The visual search task was based on that used by Le Pelley et al.,
2015. Participants began each trial by fixating in the centre of the
screen (fixation display; see Fig. 1). Once 300 ms of gaze time had ac-
cumulated in the central fixation region, the fixation cross and the
surrounding circle turned yellow, indicating that the trial was about to
begin. After 300 ms the search display appeared; this comprised a set of
seven shapes (each 2.3 × 2.3° visual angle). Six of these shapes were
distributed evenly around the centre-point of the screen, with the centre
of each shape at an eccentricity of 5.1° visual angle. The seventh shape
was positioned at the centre of the screen. The central shape was always
a circle. Of the outer shapes, five were circles, and one was a diamond
(the target). On the majority of trials, one of the circles was coloured
either blue (CIE x,y chromaticity coordinates .192/.216) or orange (CIE
x,y .493/.445), and had similar luminance (∼24.5 cd/m2). All other
shapes were grey (CIE x,y .327/.400, luminance ∼8.3 cd/m2). We refer
to the colour-singleton circle as the distractor to distinguish it from the
other (grey) circles in the display, which we refer to as non-salient non-
targets. We also included a small number of no-colour-singleton trials
(all shapes rendered in grey, no colour singleton).
Participants’ task was to move their eyes as quickly as possible to
the diamond target: a response was registered once 100 ms of gaze
dwell time had accumulated within a region of interest (diameter 3.5°
Fig. 1. A. Trial structure of the visual search task used
in Experiment 1. Participants had to move their eyes to
the diamond as quickly as possible on each trial. If
they did so before the reward time-limit then they
received either 10 or 500 points. The number of points
available on each trial was signalled by the colour of
the colour-singleton distractor – in this example blue
signals availability of 500 points (high reward). B. The
coloured distractor (blue or orange) could appear in
one of the six outer locations or at the central location.
The target (diamond) never appeared at the central
location. (For interpretation of the references to colour
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article).
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visual angle) centred on this target. The colour of the distractor circle
signalled the magnitude of reward that was available on each trial. For
half of participants, blue was the high-reward colour and orange was
the low-reward colour; for the other half of participants this mapping
was reversed. If the display contained a distractor rendered in the high-
reward colour, an eye-movement to the diamond target could earn 500
points; if the display contained a distractor in the low-reward colour (or
no colour-singleton), a response could earn only 10 points. The trial
ended immediately when a response was registered, or after 2000 ms
(timeout).
Whether participants earned the available reward on each trial
depended on whether their response time (RT: the time from onset of
the search display to the point at which 100 ms of dwell time had ac-
cumulated on the target) was less than the reward time-limit for the
current block of trials. For all participants the reward time-limit during
the first block was 1500 ms. From the second block onwards, the re-
ward time-limit was the 75th percentile of recorded RTs from the
previous block. If RT on a given trial was less than the reward time-limit
for that trial, the participant earned a reward, with a feedback screen
showing the number of points earned (either 10 or 500 points, as spe-
cified above). If RT was greater than the reward time-limit or if no
response was registered before the timeout, the feedback “Too slow:
+0 points. You could have won [10/500] points” appeared as appro-
priate.1
Each block consisted of 70 trials. Sixty of these trials featured a
colour-singleton distractor. In half of these distractor-present trials, the
singleton distractor appeared in the central location; in the other half,
the distractor appeared in one of the six outer locations (see Fig. 1B).
Within each of these sets of trials (central-distractor and outer-dis-
tractor), in half of trials the distractor was rendered in the high-reward
colour, and in the other half it was rendered in the low-reward colour.
The remaining 10 trials of each block were no-colour-singleton trials.
The target never appeared in the central location. Within these con-
straints, the locations of the target and singleton-distractor (if one was
present) were chosen randomly on each trial.
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants were informed that their task was to move their eyes to
the diamond “as quickly and directly as possible”, and that they would
receive a monetary bonus (“typically $8 to $13”) at the end of the
experiment, depending on how many points they earned; no other in-
formation on the conversion rate between points and money was pro-
vided. Participants were then instructed on the colour–reward con-
tingencies in the visual search task, e.g., that whenever a blue circle was
present in the display, they could win 500 points for looking at the
diamond, and whenever an orange circle was present, they could win
10 points. Participants were also informed that they would only win the
points if they moved their eyes to the diamond quickly, and that this
would get more difficult in each block. Participants completed 6 blocks
(420 trials) in total and took a short break between blocks.
2.1.4. Data analysis
Data analysis followed our previous protocols using similar proce-
dures (Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson et al., 2016). We discarded the
data from the first two trials of each block, trials which timed-out be-
fore a response was recorded (0.8% of all trials), and trials with less
than 25% valid gaze location data (0.2% of all trials). Our primary
measures of interest were the latency and direction of the first saccade
made after onset of the search display, for each of the different trial
types. A velocity-threshold identification algorithm (Salvucci &
Goldberg, 2000) was used to detect saccades with a velocity criterion of
40° visual angle per second (using the raw data from the eye tracker
sampled at 300 Hz, rather than the down-sampled data used for gaze-
contingent control of stimulus presentation). As in our previous work
(Le Pelley et al., 2019; Pearson et al., 2016), a saccade was defined as
going in the direction of a stimulus if its angular deviation was less than
30° to the left or right of the location of the centre of that stimulus.
Trials were excluded from the saccade analysis if the participant made
an anticipatory saccade (defined as a saccade latency below 80 ms), the
start point of the saccade was more than 100 pixels from the centre of
the screen, or if there was insufficient eye-gaze data to identify a sac-
cade. Two participants had more than 20% of their trials discarded
according to these criteria and so were excluded from the saccade
analysis. For the remaining 22 participants, 7% of total trials were
discarded.
Our primary interest in this study was the influence of reward on
performance. Hence our analyses focused on the contrast between trials
with a high-reward distractor, and trials with a low-reward distractor.
This allows us to isolate the effect of reward, since in both cases the
search display featured a colour-singleton distractor—the only differ-
ence being the size of reward that the distractor signalled. All raw data
(including data from no-colour-singleton trials, which are not analysed
here as they do not relate to our central question) are available at
https://osf.io/je6p5/.
For central-distractor trials, the target (a shape singleton) was the
only salient stimulus in the display outside the fixation region. For these
trials, our primary focus was the proportion and latency of first sac-
cades that were directed towards the target, as a function of signalled
reward (high vs low reward). For outer-distractor trials there were two
salient stimuli in the display that participants might saccade to: the
(shape-singleton) target and the (colour-singleton) distractor. Initial
analysis of outer-distractor trials therefore examined the proportion of
first saccades directed towards either the target or the distractor as a
function of signalled reward (high vs low reward). We then used re-
peated-measures ANOVA to investigate the latency of these first sac-
cades as a function of direction (towards target vs distractor) and sig-
nalled reward. Finally, in order to assess the negative consequences of
reward-related attentional bias—through RT slowing leading to lost
rewards—we examined the proportion of trials on which participants
received reward (either 500 points or 10 points as appropriate): that is,
trials on which the response was faster than the reward time-limit.
These data were analysed using repeated measures ANOVA with factors
of distractor location (central vs outer) and signalled reward. We per-
formed follow-up contrasts to explore significant effects. Where as-
sumptions of sphericity were violated, Greenhouse-Geisser p-values are
reported with the original degrees of freedom.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Saccade analysis: central-distractor trials
We examined the direction and latency of first saccades on central-
distractor trials as a function of signalled reward (high vs low reward).
Unsurprisingly, given that the target was the only salient stimulus in the
display outside the fixation region, the proportion of first saccades di-
rected towards the target was high on both high-reward trials (M = .80,
SEM = .03) and low-reward trials (M = .78, SEM = .03), with no sig-
nificant difference between conditions, t(21) = 1.29, p = .212,
dz = .18. Importantly, analysis of the latencies of these saccades-to-
target on central-distractor trials (Fig. 2A) revealed that participants
were significantly slower to initiate a saccade away from the high-re-
ward distractor relative to the low-reward distractor, t(21) = 4.63, p<
.001, dz = .37, indicating delayed disengagement from the high-reward
1 Unlike in Le Pelley et al.’s (2015) previous study, in the current procedure
looking at the colour-singleton distractor did not lead to omission of the reward.
We could not practically implement this reward-omission criterion here: since
participants began central-distractor trials looking at the distractor, doing so
would have made it impossible to earn reward on these trials. Nevertheless, the
time pressure for making a rapid eye movement to the target in the current
procedure (slow responses were not rewarded) should have encouraged parti-
cipants to saccade to the target as quickly and as directly as possible (see: Le
Pelley, Pearson, Porter, Yee, & Luque, 2019).
P. Watson, et al. Cognition 195 (2020) 104125
4
distractor.
2.2.2. Saccade analysis: outer-distractor trials
On outer-distractor trials, participants’ first saccade was sig-
nificantly more likely to go in the direction of the high-reward dis-
tractor versus the low-reward distractor, t(21) = 6.55, p < .001, dz =
1.4 (see Fig. 2B). Correspondingly, the first saccade was less likely to go
towards the target on trials with a high-reward distractor, t(21) = 5.97,
p < .001, dz = 1.24. We next analysed latency of the first saccade as a
function of saccade direction (towards the target or the colour-singleton
distractor) and signalled reward (high reward vs low reward): see
Fig. 2C. Data from one participant were excluded from this analysis as
this participant never made a first saccade towards the target on low-
reward trials with an outer distractor. For the remaining participants,
ANOVA revealed a main effect of direction, with saccades towards the
distractor emitted (on average) more rapidly than those towards the
target, F(1,20) = 90.1, p< .001, ηp2 = .82. Although there was a
significant interaction between direction and signalled reward, F(1,20)
= 4.41, p = .049, ηp2 = .18, follow-up tests did not reveal a significant
effect of signalled reward on saccade latencies directed towards either
the target, t(20) = 1.41, p= .174, dz = .15, or the distractor, t(20)
= 1.47, p = .156, dz = .20.
2.2.3. Dwell time analysis: outer-distractor trials
As mentioned earlier, previous studies that included only outer-
distractor trials have used the duration of gaze dwell-time on reward-
related distractors to index attentional disengagement (Le Pelley et al.,
2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012) – a measure that we have argued
is likely to be insensitive. For completeness, we derived the same
measure for the current data: for the subset of outer-distractor trials on
which participants registered any gaze on the reward-related distractor,
we calculated the duration for which gaze remained on this distractor.
While there was a trend in the direction of longer dwell time on high-
reward distractors (M= 121 ms, SEM = 7 ms) than on low-reward
distractors (M= 113 ms, SEM =6ms), this did not reach significance t
(23) = 1.73, p = 0.098, dz = .35.
2.2.4. Proportion of trial payouts
Fig. 2D shows the proportion of trials on which participants re-
ceived reward (either 10 points or 500 points as appropriate), as a
function of distractor location (central vs outer) and signalled reward.
ANOVA revealed a main effect of distractor location, F(1,21) = 61.3,
p < .001, ηp2 = .72, with participants performing better (receiving
more rewards) for central-distractor trials than outer-distractor trials:
central-distractor trials were easier by virtue of the target being the
only salient item in the outer display. There was also a significant main
effect of signalled reward, F(1,21) = 34.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .60, with a
lower proportion of trial payouts on trials with a high-reward distractor
versus a low-reward distractor. These main effects were qualified by a
significant interaction between distractor location and signalled re-
ward, F(1,23) = 24.6, p< .001, ηp2 = .52, with a greater effect of
signalled reward for outer-distractor trials than central-distractor trials.
However, pairwise contrasts revealed that the effect of signalled re-
ward—fewer payouts for trials with high-reward versus low-reward
distractors—was significant for both central-distractor trials, t(23)
= 2.28, p= .032, dz = .50, and outer-distractor trials, t(23) = 5.86,
p< .001, dz = 1.47.
2.3. Discussion
In Experiment 1 we used eye-tracking to investigate the effect of
reward magnitude on attentional processes. Specifically, we examined
Fig. 2. Data from Experiment 1. A. Central-distractor trials: Latency of first saccades (directed towards the target) for trials featuring a high- or low-reward distractor
presented in the central location. B. Outer-distractor trials: Proportion of first saccades going in the direction of the target, the distractor, or towards one of the non-
salient non-target grey circles (labelled ‘other’). C. Saccade latency on outer-distractor trials, as a function of saccade direction (towards target or distractor) and
signalled reward (high vs low reward). D. Proportion of trial payouts, i.e., trials on which participants’ response time was below the reward time-limit and hence
reward was earned (500 points or 10 points, as appropriate). Data are shown separately for trials in which the distractor appeared at a central versus an outer
location, and as a function of whether the colour of the distractor signalled the availability of high or low reward. *** p< .001. Error bars represent within-subject
standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005) with Morey correction (Morey, 2008).
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whether a distractor predictive of high reward relative to low reward
would not only capture attention more frequently but also lead to de-
layed disengagement of attention, under conditions where participants
were motivated to move their eyes quickly to a target. Critically,
Experiment 1 included trials in which the reward-signalling distractor
appeared at the central (fixation) location, therefore requiring partici-
pants to first disengage attention from this distractor before making a
saccade to the target. On these central-distractor trials participants
were slower to initiate the first saccade when the distractor was ren-
dered in the high-reward colour relative to the low-reward colour. This
finding suggests that reward influences the process of attentional dis-
engagement: high-reward-signalling distractors are more likely to hold
attention at their location. When the distractors were presented in outer
locations, away from the central fixation point, we found that partici-
pants’ initial saccades were more likely to be in the direction of the
distractor (as opposed to the target) when the distractor signalled the
availability of high reward than when it signalled low reward. The
results from outer-distractor trials replicate previous findings from si-
milar procedures showing an influence of reward associations on the
likelihood of attentional capture by reward-signalling distractors
(Failing et al., 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson et al., 2015). For the
subset of outer-distractor trials in which participants’ gaze was captured
by the reward-related distractor, there was a trend in the direction of
gaze subsequently lingering for longer on the high-reward distractor
than the low-reward distractor; however, this trend did not reach sig-
nificance. This failure to find a significant difference in distractor dwell-
time on outer-distractor trials replicates previous findings (Le Pelley
et al., 2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012). As we noted in the in-
troduction, the approach of examining duration of dwell following
capture is likely to be an insensitive measure of influences on atten-
tional (dis)engagement. The results of Experiment 1 underscore this
issue: while distractor-dwell data from outer-distractor trials provided
only trend-level evidence of an influence of reward on disengagement,
the more sensitive analysis of central-distractor trials revealed a highly
significant effect.
Notably the greater capture by, and delayed disengagement from,
high-reward distractors that we observed in Experiment 1 was coun-
terproductive to participants’ goal of earning reward. Participants re-
ceived the available reward on each trial (10 or 500 points) only if they
moved their eyes to the diamond target quickly. Hence the longer at-
tention lingered on the distractor, the lower the likelihood that reward
would be earned. Consistent with this idea, participants received sig-
nificantly fewer (large) reward payouts on trials with a high-reward
distractor than (small) payouts on trials with a low-reward distractor;
and this pattern was observed on both outer-distractor and central-
distractor trials.
3. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we sought to replicate the finding of delayed dis-
engagement from high-reward-signalling distractors using a variant of
the visual search task in which the critical measure was RT to make a
manual response based on the identity of the target, rather than eye
gaze (see e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2015, Experiment 2). In this procedure,
greater RT on trials with a high-reward central distractor (versus a low-
reward central distractor) would indicate an influence of reward on
attentional disengagement – the longer attention lingered on the central
distractor, the slower participants would be to identify and respond to
the target. In particular, Experiment 2 investigated whether reward
would still influence disengagement from a central location under
conditions in which the reward-signalling distractor only appeared at
this central location (and never in one of the outer locations). Under
these conditions, participants could in principle learn to suppress at-
tention to the central location and instead focus on locating the target
among the outer locations (Leber, Gwinn, Hong, & O’Toole, 2016;
Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1996; Wang et al., 2019).
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants and apparatus
Experiment 2 was run as part of a practical class for second-year
Psychology students at UNSW Sydney: participants were unaware of the
aims of the study and had not been taught about this research topic
prior to participating. A total of 238 students completed the study in
their own time.2 Sixteen participants were excluded from all analyses
(see Results section), giving a final sample size of N = 222. The task
was programmed in Inquisit 5 and delivered over the internet: parti-
cipants completed the experiment using personal computers (the task
was not compatible with tablets or smart phones). Inquisit scripts are
able to access high-performance native system components on the local
machine in order to achieve millisecond-precision timing.
3.1.2. Stimuli and design
The visual search task was based on that used by Le Pelley et al.,
2015, Experiment 2). Each trial began with a central fixation cross,
which participants were instructed to fixate. After a random interval of
500–700 ms, the cross disappeared and was followed by a blank screen
for 150 ms, after which the search display appeared. This search display
was similar to that used in Experiment 1, except that now all shapes
were outlines, and each contained a white line segment (see Fig. 3A).
The line inside the diamond target was oriented horizontally or verti-
cally, selected at random on each trial; all other shapes contained a line
tilted 45° degrees randomly to the left or right.
Participants’ task was to respond to the orientation of the line within
the diamond target as quickly as possible, by pressing ‘C’ (horizontal) or
‘M’ (vertical). The faster participants made a correct response, the more
points they earned. On the majority of trials, a colour-singleton circle
(the distractor) appeared at the central location. The colour of this
distractor (orange or blue) indicated whether the current trial was a
high- or low-reward trial, with assignment of colours to high- or low-
reward roles counterbalanced across participants. On trials with a low-
reward central distractor (or no-colour-singleton trials in which all
shapes were grey), correct responses earned 1 point for every 10 ms
that RT was below 1000 ms (e.g., an RT of 650 ms would earn 35
points). Trials with a high-reward distractor were labelled as “bonus
trials”, and points were multiplied by 10 (e.g., RT of 650 ms would earn
350 points). Correct responses with RT > 1000 ms and incorrect re-
sponses earned no points. The search display remained on-screen until
the participant responded or the trial timed-out (after 2000 ms). A
feedback screen then appeared. If the response was correct, feedback
showed the number of points earned on that trial; if the response was
incorrect, feedback was “Error, 0 points”; and if the trial timed-out or
RT was greater than 1000 ms, feedback was “TOO SLOW: Please try to
respond faster”. On bonus (high-reward) trials feedback was accom-
panied by the text “10 × bonus trial!”. On all trials the feedback screen
also showed the total number of points earned so far.
Each block consisted of 40 trials. Thirty-two of these trials featured
a colour-singleton distractor, presented at the central location – in half
of these trials the distractor was rendered in the high-reward colour,
and in the other half it was rendered in the low-reward colour. The
remaining eight trials of each block were no-colour-singleton trials (all
shapes were grey). The target occurred randomly at one of the six outer
locations, and never appeared in the central location.
3.1.3. Procedure
Our ethical approval did not allow us to give monetary bonuses,
since participants completed this study as part of their coursework.
2We accidentally omitted to collect demographic information in Experiments
2 and 3. In the previous year, of 398 students who were taking the same course,
70% were female and mean age was 20.66 (SEM = .18) years. The participant
samples of Experiments 2 and 3 presumably had a similar demographic profile.
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Instead participants were instructed that their task was to earn as many
points as possible in order to unlock ‘expertise medals’ (see also
Albertella et al., 2019). For every 6000 points that they earned they
unlocked another medal (in the order bronze, silver, gold, platinum,
diamond, and elite); based on pilot data, this conversion rate was set so
that the best performing ∼10% of participants would unlock the ‘elite’
medal.
Participants were informed that (1) faster (correct) responses would
earn more points, (2) when a circle in the high-reward colour appeared
in the search display it would be a bonus trial on which points were
multiplied by 10, and (3) when a circle in the low-reward colour ap-
peared it would not be bonus trial. Check-questions verified that par-
ticipants understood these instructions. Participants then completed
eight blocks (320 trials) with a break between each block in which their
current expertise medal was revealed.
3.2. Results
We excluded all trials where response time was faster than 150 ms
or slower than 1000 ms. Sixteen participants who had more than 25%
of trials excluded based on these criteria, or whose mean response ac-
curacy was below 50% correct (chance level), were excluded from all
analyses.
Our primary interest was in how participants’ speed of responding
to the target was influenced by the reward-signalling status of the co-
loured distractor in the search display, i.e., the difference in mean RT
(calculated for correct responses only) on trials with a high-reward
distractor versus trials with a low-reward distractor. This provides our
index of the effect of reward on attentional disengagement. Critically, a
paired t-test revealed that RT for high-reward distractor trials
(M= 624 ms, SEM =4 ms, within-subjects SEM [wSEM: Morey, 2008]
=.85 ms) was significantly greater than for low-reward distractor trials
(M= 615 ms, SEM =4 ms, wSEM =.85 ms), t(221) = 7.72, p< .001,
dz=.52. This difference in RT did not reflect a speed–accuracy trade off:
secondary analysis revealed that response accuracy was significantly
lower on high-reward distractor trials (M= 84.7% SEM = 0.6%,
wSEM = 0.18%) than low-reward distractor trials (M = 85.3%,
SEM = 0.5%, wSEM= 0.18%), t(221) = 2.15, p = .033, dz =.14.
3.3. Discussion
Using an online version of the visual search task based on RT rather
than eye gaze, Experiment 2 demonstrated that participants were
slower (and less accurate) to respond to the search target when the
centrally located distractor signalled high reward relative to low re-
ward. This result provides a conceptual replication of the critical
finding from the central distractor trials of Experiment 1, and once
again suggests that participants are slower to disengage attention from
a distractor that has previously signalled the availability of high reward
(relative to low reward). Once again, this pattern of performance was
counterproductive, in that slower and less accurate responses corre-
sponded to rewards (points) being foregone. Unlike in Experiment 1,
Fig. 3. A. Trial structure of the visual search task used
in Experiments 2 and 3. Participants’ task was to in-
dicate with a key press whether the line inside the
diamond target was oriented vertically or horizontally.
The faster participants responded (correctly) the more
points they earned. The search display could contain a
colour-singleton shape (here a blue circle); the colour
of this shape signalled whether this was a bonus trial
on which points were multiplied by 10. B. On central-
distractor trials (Experiments 2 and 3), the colour-
singleton shape was a circle distractor which appeared
at the central location, and the target diamond ap-
peared in one of the outer locations. On central-target
trials (Experiment 3 only), the colour-singleton shape
was the target, which appeared at the central location;
all of the circles were grey. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article).
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the distractor always appeared at the central location in Experiment 2.
Thus, even when participants knew in advance where the colour-sin-
gleton distractor would appear, they were unable to prevent the
counterproductive influence of this distractor on performance. To the
extent that participants were able to suppress attention to this central
location (Leber et al., 2016; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1996; Wang et al.,
2019), this suppression was insufficient to overcome the effect of re-
ward.
To summarise, Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence of slower
responding on central-distractor trials when the distractor signalled
availability of high reward, than when it signalled low reward – a
finding that is consistent with delayed attentional disengagement from
high-reward-signalling stimuli. There is, however, potentially an al-
ternative, non-attentional explanation. It is possible that a signal of high
reward might cause a general slowdown in performance by causing
“behavioural freezing” (Müller et al., 2016), much as has been observed
in response to signals of threat (Clarke et al., 2013). If a high-reward
stimulus presented at fixation freezes participants for a short time—-
effectively pausing any ongoing behaviour—then this would manifest
in slower responding on these trials: participants would take longer to
start moving their eyes (cf. Experiment 1) or to locate and respond to
the target (cf. Experiment 2). By contrast, the account based on atten-
tional disengagement sees the high-reward distractor as holding at-
tention (specifically) for longer, but not freezing behaviour in general.
4. Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was designed to discriminate between these alter-
natives (attentional disengagement versus behavioural freezing).
Experiment 3 was closely based on Experiment 2 but included trials in
which the target appeared at the central location. Furthermore, on
these central-target trials, the target could appear in either the high-
reward or low-reward colour. If the presence of a high-reward colour in
the search display causes general behavioural freezing, then partici-
pants should be slower to respond to the target on central-target trials
with a high-reward colour than with a low-reward colour, just as they
are slower for central-distractor trials with a high-reward versus a low-
reward distractor. In both cases, the behavioural freezing account an-
ticipates that the high-reward colour will slow down ongoing beha-
viour. If instead participants are slower to disengage attention from
high-reward-signalling stimuli, then we expect a different pattern of
behaviour on central-distractor and central-target trials. On this ac-
count, participants will respond slower on central-distractor trials with a
high-reward distractor versus a low-reward distractor (as in Experiment
2), because they must disengage attention from the central distractor in
order to locate and respond to the target. By contrast, participants will
(if anything) respond faster on central-target trials with a high-reward
versus a low-reward target, because the high-reward colour will be
more likely to hold attention at the target location, enhancing proces-




Participants were 220 second-year UNSW Psychology students who
completed the study over the internet (none of these participants had
previously completed Experiment 1 or 2). Nineteen participants were
excluded from all analyses (see Results section), leaving a final sample
size of N = 201.
4.1.2. Stimuli, design and procedure
The visual search task was similar to that of Experiment 2. The only
difference was that Experiment 3 also included central-target trials, in
which the target appeared in the central location and the six outer lo-
cations held grey circles (see Fig. 3b). On these central-target trials, the
target could appear in the high-reward colour, the low-reward colour,
or grey. If the search display contained a shape rendered in the high-
reward colour (regardless of whether this was a distractor or target), the
trial was a bonus trial on which points earned for a correct response
were multiplied by 10.
Participants completed eight blocks of 40 trials each. Half of the
trials in each block were central-target trials, and the other half were
central-distractor trials (these central-distractor trials were as in
Experiment 2). For each type of trial—central-target and central-dis-
tractor—on 8 trials the central shape appeared in the high-reward
colour, on 8 trials in the low-reward colour, and on 4 trials in grey (no
colour singleton).
4.2. Results
As in Experiment 2, we excluded all trials where response time was
faster than 150 ms or slower than 1000 ms. Nineteen participants who
had more than 25% of trials excluded based on these criteria, or whose
mean response accuracy was below 50% (chance level), were excluded
from all analyses.
Our primary interest was in how participants’ speed of responding
to the target was influenced by the reward-signalling status of the
central coloured shape in the search display, and whether this influence
of reward depended on whether the central shape was a distractor or
the target. We therefore analysed mean RT (for correct responses) as a
function of central stimulus (target vs distractor) and signalled reward
(high reward vs low reward), using repeated measures ANOVA (see
Fig. 4A). This revealed a significant main effect of central stimulus, F
Fig. 4. Data from Experiment 3. A. Response
time for correct responses. B. Response accu-
racy. Data are shown separately for trials in
which the central stimulus was a distractor or a
target, and for trials in which this central shape
was rendered in a colour that signalled avail-
ability of high or low reward. * p < .05, ***
p < .001. Error bars represent within-subject
standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005)
with Morey correction (Morey, 2008).
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(1,200) = 1016.8, p< .001, ηp2 = .84, with faster responses on cen-
tral-target trials than central-distractor trials. There was also a mar-
ginally significant main effect of signalled reward, F(1,200) = 3.89, p
=.050, ηp2 = .02, superseded by an interaction between signalled re-
ward and central stimulus, F(1,200) = 76.2, p< .001, ηp2 = .28.
Planned pairwise comparisons revealed that, for central-distractor
trials, responses were significantly slower on high-reward relative to
low-reward trials, t(200) 6.39, p< .001, dz=.45. By contrast, for the
central-target trials responses were significantly faster on high-reward
relative to low-reward trials, t(200) = 6.94, p< .001, dz=.49.
A secondary analysis explored response accuracy (Fig. 4B). Here
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of central stimulus, F(1,200)
= 286.8, p< .001, ηp2 = .59, with more accurate responding on cen-
tral-target trials than central-distractor trials. There was also a sig-
nificant main effect of signalled reward, F(1,200) = 13.8, p= .001
ηp
2 = .07: overall, participants were more accurate on low-reward than
high-reward trials. The interaction was not significant, F<1, p= .88,
ηp
2< .001. Planned pairwise contrasts revealed that the effect of sig-
nalled reward was significant for central-distractor trials, t(200)
= 2.51, p = .013, dz=.18 and central-target trials, t(200) = 3.03, p =
.003, dz=.22.
The above analyses revealed that, on central-target trials, faster
responding to high-reward targets was accompanied by lower accuracy
(see Fig. 4); the difference in accuracy was numerically small, but sig-
nificant. This pattern could be taken to suggest some degree of speed-
accuracy trade-off on these trials. To examine this further, we computed
inverse efficiency (IE: Townsend & Ashby, 1978, 1983) for the central-
target trials. By dividing the latencies of correct responses by the pro-
portion of correct responses, the IE score weights response time by
accuracy and provides a useful summary of both pieces of information
(Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011). Analysis of the central-target trials revealed
that the IE score did not differ significantly between the high-reward
(M = 616 ms, SEM =7 ms) and low-reward trials (M = 618 ms,
SEM=7 ms), t(200) = 0.67, p = .506, dz = 0.05. In order to quantify
support for the null hypothesis that IE did not differ between high- and
low-reward central-target trials, we conducted a Bayesian paired t-test
using JASP (JASP Team, 2018) using the default Cauchy prior. This
yielded strong evidence in favour of the null over the (two-tailed) al-
ternative hypothesis that IE scores differed as a function of reward
value, BF01 = 10.2, error< .001%, and yet stronger evidence in favour
of the null versus the one-tailed alternative hypothesis (based on the
idea of behavioural freezing) that IE scores would be greater for high-
reward trials than low-reward trials, BF01 = 20.0, error< .001%.
4.3. Discussion
Experiment 3 found once again that participants’ responses were
slower (and less accurate) on trials where a centrally presented dis-
tractor signalled a high relative to a low reward. Critically, a very dif-
ferent pattern was observed for the central-target trials: here partici-
pants were significantly faster to respond when the colour of the central
target signalled availability of high relative to low reward. This finding
is inconsistent with the idea that a global ‘behavioural freezing’ occurs
when participants encounter a signal of high reward (Clarke et al.,
2013; Müller et al., 2016) as this would lead to a general slowing of
responses in the presence of a high-reward-signalling stimulus. That
said, there was some evidence of a potential speed-accuracy trade-off
on central-target trials, as faster responding to high-reward targets was
accompanied by lower accuracy. To examine this more closely we
analysed inverse efficiency scores, which combine speed and accuracy
to yield an overall performance measure. This analysis revealed no
significant effect of reward magnitude on performance on central-target
trials, with a Bayesian analysis yielding strong evidence in favour of the
null hypothesis. This follow-up analysis again indicates that the signal
of high reward did not produce behavioural freezing in this procedure.
These findings in turn suggest that behavioural freezing was not the
source of the impaired responding that we observed on central-dis-
tractor trials in the presence of a high-reward distractor in Experiments
1–3. Instead the findings are consistent with the idea that participants
are slower to disengage attention from a high-reward-signalling sti-
mulus, leading to slower responses on central-distractor trials (when
participants must disengage attention from the reward-signalling dis-
tractor in order to respond to the target), but no impairment (and po-
tentially facilitation) on central-target trials, since here disengagement
is not required.
5. Experiment 4
In Experiments 1–3, delayed disengagement from high-reward dis-
tractors was counterproductive to task performance, in that slower re-
sponses were less likely to be rewarded with points (Experiment 1) or
earned fewer points (Experiments 2 and 3). Under a goal-directed ac-
count of performance in this task, once participants had identified the
colour (and hence reward status) of the stimulus presented at fixation,
then they should have been faster to respond on trials in which a high
reward was at stake than when a low reward was available. The finding
of the opposite pattern (slower responses on high-reward than low-re-
ward trials) on central-distractor trials of Experiments 1–3 might
therefore be taken to suggest a relatively automatic effect of reward on
attentional disengagement, over which participants have little volun-
tary control. An alternative possibility, however, is that participants
may have deliberately prioritized attention to high-reward distractors
on the basis of their informational value (cf. Gottlieb, 2012). That is, the
presence of a high-reward distractor in the search display provided
information that the current trial could yield a large reward, and par-
ticipants may have therefore strategically prioritized attention to this
stimulus in order to identify occasions on which high reward was
available. This was a poor strategy to use since it would result in slower
responses, and hence lower rewards, than if participants ignored the
distractors. Yet it remains possible that the impaired performance on
high-reward trials reflects strategic attentional selection of the high-
reward distractor (based on its information value) rather than an in-
voluntary delay in disengagement (based on its reward value).
Experiment 4 aimed to decide between these alternatives by in-
cluding a final test phase in which participants they were explicitly
informed that no further rewards were available. Consequently, the
critical reward-related distractors no longer carried useful information
regarding reward magnitude during this unrewarded test phase—-
participants already knew that no reward would be available on each
trial—and so there was no strategic reason to attend to them. Hence if
delayed attentional disengagement from high-reward distractors re-
flects a strategic process based on informational value, then it should
immediately desist once participants are aware that rewards are no
longer available. By contrast, any attentional bias towards the high-
reward distractor that persisted during the unrewarded test phase
would demonstrate that prior training caused changes in capture, i.e.,
that pairings with reward can induce a persistent change in the atten-
tional priority of a stimulus in a way that goes beyond strategic allo-
cation of attention based on current informational value.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants and apparatus
Experiment 4 was run online, with participants recruited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid $5 and the top-
scoring 25% of participants also received a $3 bonus. A total of 151
participants completed the study. 61 participants were excluded from
all analyses (see Results section), giving a final sample size of N = 90
(39 females, age M= 36.0 years, SEM = 9.8).
5.1.2. Stimuli, design and procedure
The visual search task was the same as that used in Experiment 2,
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with the following differences. Participants were informed at the outset
that the 25% of participants who earned the most points in the task
would be rewarded with a $3 bonus. Each block of the task contained
30 central-distractor trials, half of which featured a high-reward dis-
tractor, and half of which featured a low-reward distractor. In the initial
rewarded phase of the task, participants completed 12 blocks (360 trials
total), with reward feedback provided as in Experiment 2. On com-
pleting the reward phase, participants saw the following instructions:
“FROM NOW ON, THERE ARE NO MORE POINTS AVAILABLE! This
means that you will not win any points for the rest of the game. Nevertheless,
you should carry on responding to the orientation of the line within the
diamond as quickly and accurately as possible.” Participants completed a
check-question to verify that they had understood these instructions.
They then completed the unrewarded phase, which comprised two
blocks (60 trials). These trials were similar to those of the rewarded
phase, except that now feedback stated only whether the preceding
response had been “correct” or “incorrect”: no reward information was
provided (i.e., feedback did not mention points, or whether the pre-
ceding trial had been a bonus trial).
5.2. Results
As in Experiments 2 and 3, we excluded all trials where response
time was faster than 150 ms or slower than 1000 ms. Sixty-one parti-
cipants who had more than 25% of trials excluded based on these cri-
teria, or whose mean response accuracy was below 50% (chance level),
were excluded from all analyses.
Fig. 5A shows response times from Experiment 3. A 2 (signalled
reward: high vs. low) × 2 (phase: rewarded vs. unrewarded) ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of signalled reward, F(1,89) = 12.63,
p< .001, ηp2 = .12, with an overall pattern of slower responding on
high-reward trials than on low-reward trials. Critically, planned pair-
wise comparisons revealed that this pattern of slower responses on
high-reward trials was significant in both the rewarded phase, t(89)
= 3.25, p = 0.02, dz = .34, and the unrewarded phase, t(89) = 2.14,
p = 0.035, dz = .23. The ANOVA also revealed a significant main ef-
fect of phase, F(1,89) = 14.9, p< .001, ηp2 = .14, with faster responses
during the unrewarded phase than the rewarded phase. Notably, the
signalled reward × phase interaction was not significant, F<1, p =
.78, ηp2 = .001; that is, the magnitude of slowing caused by the high-
reward distractor relative to the low-reward distractor did not differ
significantly in the rewarded and unrewarded phases. In order to
quantify support for the null hypothesis here, for each participant we
calculated the difference in response times between high- and low-re-
ward trials. A Bayesian paired t-test yielded strong support for the null
hypothesis that the magnitude of this high-versus-low difference did not
differ between phases, versus the alternative hypothesis that the dif-
ference was greater in the rewarded phase than the unrewarded phase,
BF01 = 10.6, error< .001%.
A secondary analysis explored response accuracy (Fig. 5B). Here
ANOVA revealed a marginally significant main effect of signalled re-
ward, F(1,89) = 3.5, p= .063, ηp2 = .04, with an overall trend lower
accuracy on high-reward trials than low-reward trials. Planned pairwise
contrasts revealed that the effect of signalled reward was significant
during the rewarded phase, t(89) = 2.34, p = .021, dz = .25 but not
the unrewarded phase, t(89) = 1.11, p = .268, dz = .12. The ANOVA
also revealed a significant main effect of phase, F(1,89) = 21.6,
p< .001, ηp2 = .20, with more accurate responding during the un-
rewarded phase. The signalled reward × phase interaction was not
significant, F<1, p = .85, ηp2< .001. Bayesian analysis revealed
substantial evidence in favour of the null hypothesis that the high-
versus-low difference in accuracy did not differ between phases,
BF01 = 7.37, error< .001%.
5.3. Discussion
Experiment 4 found once again that participants’ responses were
slower, but no more accurate, on trials in which a centrally presented
distractor signalled availability of a high relative to a low reward –
indicating delayed disengagement from high-reward distractors.
Notably, this counterproductive effect of reward on performance per-
sisted into a subsequent unrewarded phase, in which participants were
explicitly informed that rewards were no longer available. This finding
suggests that the impairment caused by the high-reward distractor does
not reflect participants’ strategic selection of this stimulus on the basis
of its informational value, as the distractors provided no information
during the unrewarded phase (i.e., they were entirely task-irrelevant).
Instead the results of Experiment 4 are consistent with the idea that
prior experience of distractor–reward relationships influences auto-
matic attentional prioritisation, which exerts a persistent effect on at-
tentional (dis)engagement.
6. General discussion
In the current study, we investigated whether people’s ability to
disengage attention from a visual stimulus is influenced by the mag-
nitude of reward associated with that stimulus – whether a stimulus
that signals availability of high reward holds attention for longer, even
if participants are motivated to shift attention away from this stimulus
as rapidly as possible. In Experiment 1, participants were slower to
Fig. 5. Data from Experiment 4. A. Response time for correct responses. B. Response accuracy. Data are shown separately for rewarded and unrewarded phases. *
p < .05, ns = non-significant. Error bars represent within-subject standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005) with Morey correction (Morey, 2008).
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move their eyes away from a colour-singleton distractor that signalled
high relative to low reward when this distractor appeared at a central
location. Likewise, in Experiments 2–4 participants were slower to
make a manual response to a target when the search display contained a
central distractor that signalled high reward (relative to low reward).
Notably, the slowing on high-reward central-distractor trials did not
seem to be due to a general ‘behavioural freezing’ (Clarke et al., 2013;
Müller et al., 2016) in the presence of a high-reward-signalling sti-
mulus, because we did not observe a similar slowing when the search
display contained a central target rendered in the high-reward colour
(Experiment 3). Across all experiments, this influence of reward on
saccade/response latency was counterproductive, because slower re-
sponses meant that participants earned fewer points. In Experiment 4,
we demonstrated that the effect of reward on response latency persisted
into an unrewarded phase in which participants knew that no further
rewards were available. That is, participants were still slower to re-
spond when the display contained a central distractor that had pre-
viously signalled availability of high reward versus low reward, even
though distractors no longer provided any information about reward
availability. This demonstration of an effect of reward history on re-
sponse latency under conditions where the reward-related distractors
were entirely task-irrelevant indicates that learning about reward re-
lationships exerts an automatic and involuntary influence on attention.
The current results thus highlight the conflict that arises between goal-
directed control (driving attention towards the target) and the auto-
matic attentional prioritization of reward signals (wherein reward-sig-
nalling distractors become more likely to hold attention).
Our findings are consistent with the idea that reward magnitude
modulates speed of attentional disengagement. Participants were
looking at the central location when the search display appeared. On
central-distractor trials, they had to disengage spatial attention from
the distractor that appeared at this central location in order to locate
the target. If reward influences disengagement of spatial attention, then
high-reward distractors will hold attention in the central location for
longer than low-reward distractors, and hence responses to the target
will be delayed – as observed in Experiments 1-4. By contrast, on
central-target trials (Experiment 3) maintenance of attention at the
central location will (if anything) facilitate processing of the target,
producing the observed pattern of faster responses on high-reward trials
than low-reward trials. The current results are somewhat reminiscent of
certain findings from the attentional blink procedure (and variants of it),
which could be taken to suggest that reward-related stimuli can ‘hold’
cognitive processing at a particular point in time (Failing & Theeuwes,
2015; Le Pelley et al., 2017, Le Pelley, Watson, Pearson, Abeywickrama,
& Most, 2018; O’Brien & Raymond, 2012; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009).
Our findings go beyond this prior work to show that reward also in-
fluences the extent to which stimuli hold attention in space. More
generally the current results are in line with the idea that cues signal-
ling reward take on motivational salience (Robinson & Berridge, 1993,
2001) and become ‘motivational magnets’ from which it is difficult to
disengage attention, even when it is in an observer’s best interest to do
so.
As noted above, delayed disengagement from high-reward dis-
tractors was counterproductive in the current experiments. In
Experiments 1 and 4, it came at a financial cost, since slower responses
were less likely to be rewarded with points that corresponded to a
monetary bonus. Experiments 2 and 3 also revealed a significant effect
of the reward-signalling status of distractors on performance, even
though rewards were entirely symbolic in this task – points had no
tangible monetary value. It seems that the accumulation of points per se
(or the medals unlocked by these points) provided sufficient inherent
motivation for effects of reward to emerge (see also Albertella et al.,
2019).
In all of the experiments reported here, we manipulated whether
distractors were associated with high or low reward and observed an
effect of this reward manipulation on attentional disengagement. The
current data do not allow us to determine whether this effect is specific
to rewards per se, or whether it would extend to other motivationally
significant events. For example, punishments are also motivationally
significant (they will drive behaviour) but differ from rewards in their
valence (rewards are positive [appetitive]; punishments are negative
[aversive]). Previous research examining attentional capture has re-
vealed parallel findings for rewards and punishments, consistent with a
central role for motivational significance (e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2018;
Wentura, Müller, & Rothermund, 2014; for review see: Watson,
Pearson, Wiers et al., 2019): future research using the current proce-
dure but with monetary losses instead of gains could investigate whe-
ther a similar parallel applies in the case of attentional disengagement
(cf. Müller et al., 2016).
The current study contributes to a body of work examining effects of
selection history (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Failing &
Theeuwes, 2018) on attention, investigating how learning about the
relationship between a neutral stimulus (here a colour) and reward
influences attention to that stimulus. This research has parallels with a
wider literature that has examined the effects of stimuli that have a pre-
existing motivational status, investigating attentional bias towards
drug-related stimuli (e.g., pictures of cigarettes or alcohol) in the con-
text of addiction (see Christiansen et al., 2015; Field & Cox, 2008) and
threat-related stimuli (e.g., pictures of angry faces) in the context of
anxiety (see Cisler & Koster, 2010; Mulckhuyse, 2018). Notably, studies
in both areas have reported evidence of biases in attentional dwell time;
i.e., delayed disengagement from drug-related stimuli (e.g., Bradley,
Mogg, Wright, & Field, 2003; Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2004; Mogg,
Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 2003) and threat-related stimuli (e.g.,
Belopolsky, Devue, & Theeuwes, 2011; Mogg, Holmes, Garner, &
Bradley, 2008; Schmidt, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2017). The current
finding of delayed disengagement from learned signals of reward might
therefore be taken to suggest a parallel between the processes under-
lying attentional bias resulting from selection history, and biases ob-
served for ‘inherently’ motivational stimuli that are implicated in
clinical disorders (Albertella et al., 2017, 2019; Anderson et al., 2013;
Anderson, 2016). However, we remain somewhat cautious in this re-
gard, given that differences in procedures used to demonstrate effects
on ‘attentional disengagement’ may result in those procedures tapping
different processes. For example, studies of drug-related stimuli have
tended to use the dot-probe task (see Introduction). When the target
follows the cues at longer latencies (i.e. 2000 ms), faster responses to
the target on valid trials (when it replaces the drug-related cue, e.g., a
picture of alcohol) relative to invalid trials (when it replaces the control
cue, e.g., a picture of a soft drink) are argued to represent a tendency for
the participant to delay disengagement of attention from the drug
image, relative to the control image (Bradley et al., 2003; Field et al.,
2004; Mogg et al., 2003). Notably, however, under these conditions
there is no strong reason not to attend to the drug-related cue: the target
is equally likely to appear in either location and the drug image is
presumably more desirable than the control image for a heavy drug-
user. As such the resulting attentional bias may well reflect a strategic,
goal-directed choice by the participant to maintain attention to the
drug-related cue (for evidence consistent with this idea, see Preciado,
Munneke, & Theeuwes, 2017). By contrast, in the current study at-
tending to reward-distractors was counterproductive, in that the
target always appeared elsewhere – and the effect of reward on disen-
gagement persisted even when distractors were entirely task-irrelevant
(Experiment 4). Our data suggest, therefore, that reward has an auto-
matic effect, making it harder for participants to disengage attention
even when they are motivated to do so. Future research could use a
procedure based on the current task to shed further light on the stra-
tegic versus automatic nature of a ‘disengagement bias’ associated with
drug- or threat-related stimuli, which could have important implica-
tions for future development and refinement of attentional-bias-re-
training interventions for addiction and anxiety (Rinck et al., 2018;
Wiers et al., 2013).
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Finally, our findings raise the question of whether previous de-
monstrations of reward-related attentional bias reflect an influence of
reward on attentional capture (as has often been assumed), or whether
they might instead reflect delayed disengagement. Consider, for ex-
ample, the outer-distractor trials of Experiment 1, in which we observed
that gaze was more likely to move towards a high-reward distractor
than a low-reward distractor. One interpretation of this pattern is that
high-reward distractors were more likely to capture attention. An al-
ternative possibility appeals to pre-saccadic (covert) attentional pro-
cesses which allow for rapid identification of visual stimuli, prior to and
in parallel with programming of eye movements (Godijn & Theeuwes,
2002). Notably, in the current study reward-related distractors were
colour singletons (as in many studies of reward-related attentional bias:
e.g., Anderson et al., 2011; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson et al., 2015,
2016; Watson, Pearson, Chow et al., 2019), which we might expect to
capture attention on the basis of their physical salience (Theeuwes,
1992). This gives rise to an alternative interpretation in which covert
attention is first captured by the physically-salient colour singleton, and
a saccade is then triggered to that location when attentional disen-
gagement is slowed by reward (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002; Müller et al.,
2016). For a low-reward-signalling distractor, disengagement may be
sufficiently rapid that attention is re-oriented away from the distractor
before a saccade to this distractor is programmed or emitted. By con-
trast, on this account the high-reward-signalling distractor holds covert
attention for longer, such that attention is more likely to still be at the
location of the distractor when the first saccade is programmed. The
findings of our central-distractor trials demonstrate that reward influ-
ences disengagement; the current data are unable to confirm whether
an influence of reward on capture also contributes to the reward-related
bias observed on outer-distractor trials. On this point, we note that
reward-related attentional bias has also been demonstrated under
conditions in which the reward-signalling stimuli are not physically
salient (see: Anderson & Halpern, 2017; Failing et al., 2015; Failing &
Theeuwes, 2017). However, a similar argument could still apply here:
covert attention may occasionally be allocated to distractors, either
randomly or because they have previously been targets of search
(Anderson & Halpern, 2017), and reward may then delay disengage-
ment from these distractors – producing the observed reward-related
bias. Establishing unequivocally whether reward influences the like-
lihood of capture (specifically) may not be possible on the basis of
existing findings, since we lack a way of reliably measuring the location
of covert attention. When considering the wider clinical significance of
attentional bias for reward this may be a moot point, given that reward
cues tend to be physically salient by design (e.g., a neon beer logo
flashing outside a bar). Nonetheless, this remains an interesting puzzle
for future research in this area to solve.
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